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Resumo: 
Discuto reflexão como um meio de atingir crença verdadeira e evitar erro. Argumento 
na primeira seção como a questão pode ser tratada como um problema à parte. Na 
segunda seção, discuto a abordagem à reflexão na Epistemologia das Virtudes de Sosa. 
Na terceira, abordo problemas para esta perspectiva e argumento que, caso ignorância 
possua valor epistêmico, mostra-se como uma interessante maneira de lidar com as 
dificuldades mencionadas.  
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Abstract: 
I discuss reflection as a means to achieve true belief and avoid error. I argue in the first 
section how can this be treated as a separate problem. In the second section, I discuss 
Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology approach to the epistemic value of reflection. In the third, I 
raise problems for this view and argue that, if ignorance possesses epistemic value, it is 
an interesting form of dealing with these difficulties. 
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The main goal of this paper is to discuss the limits and the prospects of 
attributing to reflection an epistemic value. I will argue that the view is defendable, 
albeit still in need of further development. In the first section, I give reasons in favor of 
a separate treatment of the notion of reflection and its value in Epistemology. In the 
second, I discuss how Ernest Sosa discerns the epistemic value of reflection. In the final 
section, I raise a few difficulties for the view and suggest how they could be dealt with. 
 
1.  
 
The goal of this section is to show how reflection can be treated as a separate 
topic in Epistemology, albeit one inter-related with other important current debates in 
the field, specially the internalism / externalism divide from which it emerges. As it will 
become clear, the issue is not reflection itself, but the question of its epistemic value. 
And a quick note about epistemic value is important before I proceed. I evoke the notion 
of epistemic value without assuming anything as strong as that there is this value. When 
I use ‘epistemic value’ I merely assume, as Pritchard (2016, p.135) says, epistemic 
value is based in “whatever promotes truth in one’s belief, and the avoidance of error”. I 
understand that this is sufficient for the discussion I want to make1. Thus, in what 
follows, I discuss different ways of making sense of the epistemic role of reflection. By 
the end, my aim is to offer a basic and initial understanding of the problems related to 
reflection and its value to our epistemic goals.  
I believe is best to begin with internalist views regarding epistemic justification 
for a specific reason. Basically, as a whole, most internalists hold that, if an epistemic 
agent believes in a justified proposition, she must at least be able to tell by reflection 
that her belief is justified, that is, she must at least be able to make a movement of 
recognition of what favors the justification of her beliefs. Thus, in general, we could 
identify this first epistemic role for reflection: it is the means through which I identify 
 
1 As I intend to make a point about the epistemic role of reflection in our cognitive lives, I understand that 
it is sufficient to work with the notion above described, even though I’m aware that there is a fierce 
discussion about whether value and epistemic value are different, as Pritchard mentions in the work cited. 
Also, I will put aside other possible positive epistemic outcomes for reflection: understanding and 
rationality, for example. 
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what makes the propositional content of my belief true, i.e., the crucial feature capable 
of allowing myself to discern when my belief is justified. 
Being more specific, it is possible to sort at least two basic kinds of epistemic 
internalism. Pappas (2014) shows this by explaining that, for the internalist, what an 
epistemic agent has to access through reflection is a justifier.  He tracks this term back 
to Alston (1989, p. 189), where a justifier encompasses other beliefs, experiences and 
facts concerning how the belief came about, and are obviously responsible for justifying 
a belief. I wish to emphasize something about the access of these justifiers through 
reflection, namely, the constraints on the scope of access are responsible for delineating 
two basic manners of conceiving internalism: 
 
Weak Access Justification Internalism (WAJI): one has justified belief that p 
only if one can become aware by reflection of some essential justifier one then has for 
p. (PAPAS, 2014) 
 
Strong Access Justification Internalism (SAJI): one has justified belief that p 
only if one can become aware by reflection that some item j is an essential justifier one 
then has for p. (PAPAS, 2014)2 
 
Observe how reflection is framed in each case. As shown, this cognitive attitude 
is applied in order to recognize what constitutes the key feature responsible for the 
belief’s justification. This means that, albeit a lot may be working for the epistemic 
status of the belief, by reflecting, the epistemic agent must be concerned only with what 
is essential for the justification. I return to the issue concerning the scope of ‘essential’ 
in the final section, where this will have consequences for a view on the epistemic 
achievements through reflection.  
When externalists offer their criticism of the access requirement, they evoke the 
plausibility of cases where justified belief should be obtained without the access 
defended by internalists. Usually, these are cases where it is put in doubt the plausibility 
 
2 In the original, the term “by reflection” is not present for strong AJI. As Papas doesn’t make any 
comment on the absence, I understand the reason is because he forgot to include.  
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of denying justification for supposedly unreflective episodes of belief formation, as 
when a child can identify her blue ball in a park. But of specific interest in the present 
occasion are episodes where a great deal of elements seems to converge to the 
justification of a belief within a short span of the time. Given the limits of our 
consciously entertaining a great number of evidences in such restrained instant, if 
justification is to be possibly manifested in these episodes, its existence would be better 
explained by externalist views on the subject, that is, a view that does not rely on 
reflection as a necessary condition for justification. 
Given the discussion I wish to make, I address a defense of this intuition through 
a reliabilist view on epistemic justification. In general, according to the view, justified 
beliefs are issued by reliable process of belief formation or acquisition. The following 
principle offered by Sosa exemplifies in a more detailed manner: 
 
General Reliabilist Principle: S's belief that p at t is justified iff it is the 
outcome of a process of belief acquisition or retention which is reliable, or leads to a 
sufficiently high preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs. (SOSA, 1991, p. 131). 
 
Thus, I may have available different process of belief acquisition or retention. 
Some of them are to be discerned from others as what epistemologists call relevantly 
reliable processes. With these, I can achieve a good deal of true beliefs without having 
to consciously reflect on their justifiers. Importantly, this would allow for occasions 
where a process could collect more evidence than I consciously could assess, given 
certain limitations in my scope of attention. Thus, it seems that, if reliabilism is true, 
then reflection should not occupy the central role which some internalists try to defend. 
However, a few intuitions associated with the role of reflection are difficult to dismiss. 
A defense of these intuitions is made through a case which became a common 
objection against externalism. To see this, imagine that S possesses an unusual faculty 
among humans which issues ‘a sufficiently high preponderance of true beliefs over false 
beliefs’, as mentioned above. Moreover, the propositional contents of these beliefs 
describe situations in a place far away from where S stands now. This makes a very 
difficult case for S to gather justifiers in favor of her belief. Plausibly, she would also be 
lacking in justifiers which could support the having of such faculty, not so common 
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among humans. It is more probable that S would possess justifiers against the very 
existence of her faculty. In a possible exemplifying scenery of such cases (cf. 
BONJOUR, 1980), Norman, a clairvoyant who is in Nashville, forms the true belief that 
‘the president of the United States is now in NY’, although any justifier she possess in 
the present moment cannot appropriately support this. According to the principle above 
mentioned, the beliefs obtained through this faculty are justified. However, it is intuitive 
and plausible to ask, given what she has in favor of the proposition and the possession 
of the faculty, if S should ascribe justification to her beliefs. The most plausible 
response expected from a reasonable believer would be to avoid giving assent to these 
mental states.  
There are two initial ways of dealing with the case. In the first, the internalist 
could argue that the reliabilist is caught in a difficult position in this example. On the 
one hand, if the view allows for a reflective consideration of Norman’s available 
information, we're going to have cases where justified beliefs are discarded. After all, 
the president is actually in NY but, by reflecting on what she has available, the 
epistemic agent would discard such belief. On the other hand, if the view discards 
reflection as a whole and sticks to its principles, then reliabilism will end up endorsing 
counter-intuitive cases of justified belief. Thus, it is clear how both paths could 
undermine a defense of this conception of epistemic justification, thereby hinting a 
resort to an internalist framework as a way of dealing with the problem.  
But Pappas (2014) rightly observes that the internalist is not immune to troubles 
if she associates reflection with the recognition of justifiers. The point is how strong 
should be the recognition of these justifiers? Pappas shows that, depending on how this 
is calibrated, a dilemma emerges for the internalist3. In the case of a weak recognition, 
there is something similar to WAJI described above, with the addendum that such 
recognition would be non-conceptual. There is a problem with recognizing by reflection 
something non-conceptual which justifies my belief: in the end, the internalist would be 
not far from a reliabilist framework, being the awareness of a justifier not so central for 
justification. 
 
3 The dilemma is originally proposed by Bergmann (2006). 
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In the second case, if I pursue recognition in the strong sense, I would follow 
something similar to strong AJI above. Then, by having a justified belief that p, I would 
be able to recognize the item j which justifies p. Also, I would be able to recognize j1, 
which justifies me in believing that j justifies p. As the same would apply to j1, we face 
the prospect of an infinite regress, once that, under these strong demands, the 
recognition of a justifier j amounts to knowing that j justifies a belief, i.e., I would have 
to be justified in pointing out j as a justifier. Moreover, also under these requirements, 
the epistemic agent is in the path of a highly complex web of beliefs which would 
hardly be graspable at a certain point.  
As I understand, the upshot of the discussion so far is that, if we approach the 
matter of the epistemic value of reflection as a way of defending an internalist 
framework, we may end up treating this cognitive attitude as something innocuous or 
merely secondary. For, the clairvoyant example does not make a case for reflection 
specifically, but for internalism, whose intuitions are closely associated with the role 
reflection has in our cognitive lives. Moreover, internalism can be defended without 
necessarily relying on reflection as a condition for justification. All that could be 
required is that the subject recognizes a link between her belief, what makes her belief 
true and how both are connected. Papas (2014) remarks that, observing the difficulties 
raised by the dilemma above, a basic notion of recognition or awareness of what 
justifies a belief would be better off as a way out. If this reasoning is correct, then the 
question of the epistemic value of reflection should be addressed in parallel to the 
discussion of the internalism / externalism divide. 
This is what happens in the second way of dealing with the clairvoyant case. 
When Sosa (1991, p. 132) addresses the basic features of the case, he draws greater 
attention to S’s reflective assessment of her own beliefs. Sosa discerns an incoherence 
between the reflective assessment and the non-reflective formation of beliefs. He 
endorses the internalist view that reflection is in this case damaging the believer, for it is 
precluding her from true beliefs. But instead of yielding to a full resort to an internalist 
framework, he understands that the problem demands a solution for the schism or 
incoherence between reflective and non-reflective faculties. As something which is 
mostly generated through a reflective take on non-reflective beliefs, he deems this 
situation a meta-incoherence problem. I would suggest that a different way of stating 
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this second implication is to say that, by attempting to put reflection aside as a source of 
positive epistemic results, the reliabilist is confronted with the meta-incoherence 
problem as a side effect obtained from the inadequate theoretical treatment given to 
reflection. Behind this analysis stands the view that a good theory in Epistemology 
should give due weight to both reflective and non-reflective achievements. In what 
follows, I understand it is plausible and possible to assume this position for the reasons 
already pointed out, i.e., to concentrate on the issue of reflection in parallel to the 
externalism / internalism debate. 
With this in mind, the question now is what are the main challenges if we wish 
to explore the epistemic value of reflection? It seems that, even if treated as a separate 
issue, many of the difficulties of an internalist view seem to persist also for reflection. 
For, if I try to promote truth for my beliefs and avoid error, I may encounter problems in 
identifying what favors the truth of what I believe, or the conditions in which I’m 
entitled to recognize I’m not in error. Moreover, if attain success in these two tasks, 
what is the difference between the belief thus obtained and the others differently 
reached? I think as proper to explore these questions from a framework which was 
designed to respond them.  
 
2. 
 
I propose with this section to explore a framework which offers a path to 
understand the epistemic role of reflection in a cognitive life. This way of exploring the 
issue is important for it gives a way of delimitating what we meant by reflection when it 
is demanded as a means to access what supports the truth of our beliefs. My proposal, 
then, is to discuss the reliabilist Virtue Epistemology of Ernest Sosa.  
Sosa’s view went through many modifications throughout the years. I address a 
few of them here, with the focus on what I intend to discuss. A very important point is 
to explain when the virtue is actually responsible for the case of justified belief. To do 
this, Sosa (2007, p. 22) develops a normative framework which is based on important 
assumptions. The first one is that knowledge comes in degrees, being the low ones 
called animal knowledge, and the more sophisticated ones, reflective knowledge. The 
second one is that, to better address the difficulties regarding epistemic justification, a 
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change in the vocabulary would be welcome. And this is where his normative 
framework begins to take place. He initially frames beliefs as a sort of performance. But 
not any sort of performance, only those with a specific aim. In the case of belief, it is 
obvious that the aim is truth. And to evaluate this performance, Sosa displays the AAA 
structure of his normative framework. It must be Accurate, Adroit and Apt. Thus, a 
belief might be solely true, which allows one to say that it was an Accurate 
performance. Also, even if false, it might demonstrate certain dexterity, exhibiting 
Adroitness. However, there is a situation in which the Accuracy of the performance is 
importantly obtained through the Adroitness manifested. In this central case for the 
theory, it is manifested an Apt performance, which may also be deemed and apt belief. 
This last case is central because represents the moment where knowledge is achieved. 
Knowledge, then, is apt belief, i.e., an accurate belief achieved importantly through 
adroitness.  
How does intellectual virtue feature in this scheme? The notion is responsible 
for explaining the presence of adroitness and its important contribution for the accuracy 
of the belief or performance, i.e., aptness. Thus, intellectual virtue becomes something 
taken as a skill which allows its possessor to succeed whenever she tries.  
However, it is important now to return to a feature of Sosa’s view. As mentioned 
above, he offers the perspective that knowledge has degrees. The doubt here is how to 
draw a distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. For it looks as if we are 
endowed with a cognitive repertoire with different skills which, if virtuous, will issue 
more true beliefs than false, or more apt performances than mere cases of accuracy or 
sole adroitness. But this is supposed to be something that largely happens despite any 
reflective standing of an epistemic agent. Put differently, the AAA framework does not 
seem to afford for an explanation of what it means to achieve reflective knowledge, as 
Sosa intends to do with his virtue epistemology. However, he makes a huge effort to 
work out a view of reflective knowledge out of his proposed framework. In addressing 
this effort, it is interesting to approach it in two different moments: a perspectivist 
moment and a competence moment. In both moments, there are two basic questions I 
wish to explore: how does one achieve a higher level of knowledge? And why is this 
sort of knowledge better than the animal one? 
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In the first moment, Sosa usually begins his explanation of reflective knowledge 
from a principle like the following one: 
 
Principle of the Criterion: Knowledge is enhanced through justified trust in the 
reliability of its sources (SOSA, 2009, p. 139) 
 
There are other occasions where he offers a more detailed principle, but I think 
this one is enough to make the point I wish to. Thus, the question of ‘how to achieve’ 
seems to be initially responded by the principle. The epistemic agent achieves a higher 
level of knowledge by justifiably believing, or trusting, that the sources of this same 
knowledge are reliable. To understand better what this means I recall a basic detail in 
this debate, i.e., we are talking about propositional knowledge. So the aim is to achieve 
reflective knowledge of a certain proposition. To bring forth the justification that would 
allow this, and which is mentioned in the principle, the epistemic agent has to put in 
perspective the proposition she aims to reflectively know. In order to perform this task 
she would assess the reliability of the mental state related to the referred propositional 
content, that is, the belief. A basic criterion in this assessment is the coherence she can 
observe surrounding the belief under focus. Through the inferences made, she would 
begin to recognize the web of beliefs cohering with the target belief, thereby enhancing 
the understanding of, not only the truth of the belief, but why the belief is true. This is 
the process which is supposed to conduct the epistemic agent towards a reflective 
standing in her knowledge of a proposition she believes.  
Unfortunately, the picture we have so far does not offer an explanation of how 
reflection makes a difference, in terms of positive epistemic results. For the 
achievements obtained through reflection are only to be so considered when connected 
to perceptual faculties already positively evaluated through the AAA framework. Put 
differently, it is not clear, yet, how reflective knowledge comes about, once reflection, 
through coherence and understanding, does not add much to the positive epistemic 
result which was achieved through virtuous faculties. It might be said that reflection 
brought an enhancement of the justification. But there are, basically, two problems with 
this view. First, this enhancement is something which occurs outside the boundaries of 
the AAA framework. Thus, it is difficult to assess it as reflective knowledge. There 
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might be room to call it reflective justification. But with this, on the one hand, we face 
the threat of the alternative systems objection to Coherentism, where two coherent 
systems of beliefs can be presented as justification for, respectively, p and not-p. On the 
other hand, by resorting to perception successfully manifested in the AAA scheme as a 
way of escaping this objection, a threat of circularity in reasoning emerges: the 
coherence of the system is confirmed by the reliability of perception, and the reliability 
of perception by the coherence of the system. 
To better theoretically encompass what is a reflective achievement, Sosa (2015) 
brings forth a complimentary framework. And the basic strategy is to conceive 
important aspects of reflection as voluntarily manifested by an epistemic agent. More 
specifically, Sosa (2015, p. 124 and 129) conceives the different manifestations of our 
cognitive life as ranging inside a continuum, from non-volitional to volitional states. 
Thus, it is observable that already in the AAA framework above explained, Sosa has 
under his focus only performances with an aim. What happens is that the non-
volitional/volitional line changes the way these aims are established. In the first case, 
the performances have their aims biologically or functionally determined. In the second 
case, we verify the role of intention as responsible for the delimitation of the aim. 
Moreover, in the volitional context a different understanding of performances arises, 
one that takes these performances as actions. In what follows I explain how this works 
in order to render clear how reflective achievements are framed in the theory. 
Initially, Sosa (2015, p. 95) develops what he calls the SSS (Seat, Shape and 
Situation) structure of evaluation with two basic goals in mind. First, to allow his theory 
to give a proper explanation of responsibilism, the lack of which was a constant critic 
cast against his Virtue Epistemology. Second, to address a question yet in need of 
response: when the Adroitness relevantly contribute to the Accuracy of a performance? 
It is at this point that the notions of Seat, Shape and Situation appear to complement the 
AAA structure of evaluation. More specifically, for Aptness to be achieved, the 
epistemic agent must harbor the skill (Seat), she must also be in conditions to exercise 
that ability (her Shape) and, finally, the conditions surrounding her should allow her to 
perform successfully (Situation). Once these three requirements are observed, the 
epistemic agent goes from harboring a skill to manifesting a competence, whenever she 
tries. And competence for Sosa is now the fundamental element of his Virtue 
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Epistemology, the one which explains how and why a virtue conducts one into the path 
of propositional knowledge. 
One last detail before properly giving reflection its place in the framework. 
Recall the non-volitional / volitional line. In this latter realm of our cognitive lives, Sosa 
(2015, p. 129) points out to a continuum which ranges from an affirmation aimed at 
truth (alethic) to a fully apt affirmation (or apt judgment). That is, alethic affirmations 
represent the most basic examples of what an epistemic agent can voluntarily manifest 
when trying to achieve knowledge. Besides, recall that these voluntary attempts are now 
seen as performances of a distinct kind, i.e., actions. As such, it is no surprise that the 
intention of the agent will play a highly relevant role in this framework. For in the case 
of an alethic affirmation, the epistemic agent wants to get it right. But she is not 
concerned about assuring that her attempt hits the mark, or about any consequence 
which could possibly unfold in case of any mistake. Things begin to change when these 
latter considerations enter the scope of intentions the agent harbors. She is no longer 
perpetrating an affirmation but a judgment. More specifically, she wants her affirmation 
to manifest competence or aptness according to the SSS framework (SOSA, 2015, p. 
55).  
According to the continuum established by Sosa, the most that an epistemic 
agent can aim for is the fully apt affirmation or the apt judgment. But what exactly 
happens in this case? This is a crucial moment for my purposes, for it is within these 
conditions that reflection mostly appears to be manifested. What is important to 
understand, initially, is how Sosa discerns reflection in this context. According to him, 
in this kind of judgment, the epistemic agent holds a second order look over her first 
order affirmation.  More to the point, Sosa (2015, p. 83) envisages a second order 
competence which manifests a second order intention to bring aptly a first order apt 
affirmation, and only aptly. Trying to put this in details, I think it is fair to say that the 
SSS framework applies in both levels in this case, the difference being that, in the 
second order, the epistemic agent verifies the Seat, Shape and Situation of the first order 
attempt, envisaging, when successful, the right moment to make the affirmation. But the 
epistemic agent might not be required to make this same consideration regarding her 
second order competence. She will succeed as far as her skill is in conditions to 
manifest as a competence. As Sosa (2015, p. 84) clarifies, this second order stance 
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needs not to be consciously executed, “it might be just a presupposition, an implicit 
awareness”.  
In the next section I consider what could be discern as the limits of this view, 
specially concerning the feasibility of this level of knowledge given the fact that we 
always tend to raise the bar for our achievements.  
 
3. 
 
The issue here is not reflection itself, but reflection as a means to achieve a 
positive epistemic result, be it knowledge, justification or identifying warrant for one’s 
beliefs. But, what does it mean to know a proposition reflectively, or to be justified in 
believing that p in the same manner? I took Sosa’s recent approach as an answer to this 
question, since his view places reflective achievements as issuing from an integrated 
cognitive life of an epistemic agent. Put differently, in Sosa’s framework the appeal to 
reflection in epistemic matters doesn’t emerge as a defense of internalist against 
externalist intuitions in Epistemology. This allows for an analysis which explores 
reflection as a distinctive means to achieve determinate results of our epistemic lives. 
Thus, instead of inquiring if knowledge or justification requires reflective assessment, 
what is inquired now is that which, epistemically, can only be obtained through 
reflection.  
However, I’m inclined to say that it is not clear for me, yet, how feasible are the 
conditions for achieving reflective knowledge as defended by Sosa. To explore this 
point, I begin by addressing how Sosa understands that his framework the of Norman 
the clairvoyant, as discussed in the first section. Basically, Norman can be said to have 
knowledge. After all, he possesses a skill (Seat), his clairvoyant power, which properly 
issues more true beliefs than false ones whenever Norman is in the correct Shape and 
Situation. But Sosa (2015, p. 81) states clearly that this case constitutes animal 
knowledge or, more specifically, apt affirmation. Now, it is interesting to ask if, in his 
current scenario, Norman is eligible for reflective knowledge of the proposition his 
clairvoyant power delivered. For he is free to attempt to affirm this same proposition, 
already apt, with the intent to aptly place it in a field of propositions. However, in this 
second case, Norman faces difficulties which don’t allow him to ascend to reflective 
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knowledge, even if he intended to do so. For he wouldn't be able to monitor himself and 
verify that his Shape and Situation are favorable enough to aptly affirm the proposition 
delivered by his skill (Seat). Observe that, in a way, it is possible to say that he lacks 
true (or has false beliefs) regarding his clairvoyant power, and this absence is a 
hindrance for reflective judgment. In the end, Norman possesses knowledge of a certain 
kind, albeit not the reflective one. 
To better explain this, as I understand, Sosa’s view distinguishes two basic 
obstacles for an epistemic agent to overcome and achieve reflective knowledge. They 
are the demands of responsibilism and the recognition of what counts in favor of one’s 
belief to be considered knowledge. Remember that, in the first section, the attempts to 
satisfy these demands, illustrated in the attempts of responding the clairvoyant problem, 
resulted in different sorts of puzzles. You either faced the threat of a regress (due to the 
strong access clause), or you were not able to realize what responds for your successful 
case of true belief. In order to avoid these problems, reflection was either cast aside, in 
favor of a state of basic recognition, or it became epistemically innocuous, where it 
wasn’t a necessary condition for achieving knowledge. Sosa’s treatment of the 
clairvoyant case offers a way of rescuing the intuition that reflection is not something 
epistemically innocuous, but capable of a distinctive achievement which, as 
demonstrated in the example, is not always available. The question, now, is if the two 
demands can be met without generating the puzzles mentioned. 
As seen in Sosa’s framework, knowledge can happen without the epistemic 
agent’s recognition. The responsibility evoked, however, is highly dependent on 
reflective skills or competences.  To be more specific and better circumvent what Sosa 
means when he invokes responsibility, I consider that he takes this term in a not so strict 
way. Responsibility, the one specifically observed in his Virtue Epistemology, would 
gain the sense of being accountable for what you have judge, i.e., the action you have 
performed with the intention or in the endeavor to achieve truth. This would be the 
result of a deliberation, in which the epistemic agent is honestly considering the 
deliverance of a true affirmation, once that this affirmation is supposed to be shared in a 
context of mutual collaboration (SOSA, 2015, pp. 51-53). In this sense, someone who 
delivers a false affirmation could be held responsible for the judgment she went through 
to do so. Two more details concerning this explanation. First, this sort of responsibilism 
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arises mainly out of a conscious deliberation, something very important for what I want 
to discuss. Second, remember that these judgments, when aptly conducted, represent the 
highest degree of knowledge pursued by a human being. Thus, these are key features, in 
Sosa’s theory, to understand the distinctive manifestation of the positive epistemic 
outcomes of reflection.  
Now, is this framework capable of avoiding the puzzles above mentioned? The 
problem is that, based on the description just given, a good deal of the epistemic 
responsibility of an agent is connected to her recognition of what favors the proposition 
she believes in. So, you can’t actually separate the two demands so neatly. The question, 
then, is how far the recognition must go to properly support the epistemic responsibility 
of an agent, at least to the point of allowing us to say that she achieved reflective 
knowledge? 
The first obvious step is to render clear what it means ‘recognition of what 
favors’ one’s belief. Sosa (2015, p. 82-83) mentions that there are reasons which “a 
fully proper judgment must weigh”, that is, reasons which a responsible epistemic agent 
should not neglect in her pursuing of knowing full well. They are either counter-
weighing reasons or undermining reasons. The first ones are reasons that favor an 
opposing judgment to the one which the agent intends to make. The second ones 
subdivide in absence of good reasons and reasons related to Seat and Shape, that is, 
those which an agent might have and would lead her to believe she is not in proper 
conditions to make a full apt judgment. At this point, there is already a lot to be 
considered by an epistemic agent in order to achieve the highest level of reflective 
knowledge. However, Sosa (2015, p. 84) mentions that not all of these reasons must be 
consciously entertained, for he obviously acknowledges that there is a limit for our 
scope of attention. Thus, in the case of undermining reasons related to Seat and Shape, 
it is not required that the second-order consideration feature as a conscious judgment. 
An implicit awareness would be enough. If, by this sort of awareness, the epistemic 
agent realizes she is not in conditions to perform a certain judgment, her refraining from 
doing so would be a manner through which she manifests responsibilism in her 
judgments. Also, I understand that, based on the previous views on reflection developed 
by Sosa, described in the last section, an implicit awareness is capable of accounting for 
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the absence of good reasons. In a way similar to a Gestalt, the agent would notice if she 
was short of good reasons to properly endorse a judgmental belief about a proposition. 
By conceding the role of unconscious reflection in the efforts to attain reflective 
knowledge, we might alleviate the burden of the conscious work and render feasible 
positive epistemic results through reflection. However, as I intend to argue, it does not 
lessen the burden enough. There might be cases of counter-weighing or undermining 
reasons where it seems inevitable that the agent effectively engages in conscious 
reflection. And here, there are problems for the framework defended by Sosa. 
A problem associated with reflection is that the bar can always be set higher. Not 
only because of skeptical challenges, but also due to the agent’s intention in achieving a 
higher level of knowledge. However, if being epistemically responsible is a necessary 
condition for achieving reflective knowledge and the bar can always be set higher, there 
could always be counter-weighing or undermining reasons to be considered. And if our 
scope of attention is limited, neglecting tends to be inevitable for us. Thus, 
responsibility in epistemic matters would not be attainable and, as a consequence, 
reflective knowledge.  
Sosa (2015, p. 86) offers a response to this problem. In a footnote, he mentions 
that “creatures better endowed might attain incremental enhancement not attainable by 
limited humans. Since ought implies can, however, failure to surpass that limit is no 
human flaw”. I will not enter the debate surrounding the ‘ought implies can’ maxim. In 
what follows, I concede the point as Sosa declares it. My attention, rather, is directed to 
the limit which ‘failure to surpass’ wouldn't be something blameful for the epistemic 
agent. The question is how would this limit be better characterized so that neglecting 
would not render the subject blameful? 
A plausible direction to begin responding this question is found, I understand, in 
an example commonly observed by Sosa. It concerns a case where someone dedicates 
herself to an epistemic task which prima facie could be seen as difficult to bear 
appraisal. This is the interpretation when, for instance, Sosa (2015, p. 48) describes the 
episode where someone spends a long time effort counting the number of grains in a 
bag of coffee. Apparently, even after attaining with certitude this number, the intuition 
we get it is that it was a pointless task. I don’t wish to frame the example under the 
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ethic/epistemic distinction, which was the focus in this occasion. Rather, I want to 
highlight the point Pritchard (2016, p. 138) does when considering similar contexts.  
Pritchard addresses these cases in order to discuss what he calls the trivial truths 
problem.  First, remember the notion of epistemic value above mentioned: “whatever 
promotes truth in one’s belief, and the avoidance of error” (PRITCHARD, 2016, p. 
136). Thus, if the notion of epistemic value we are working with is this one, the goal is 
to always increase our stock of true beliefs, regardless of the content of these mental 
states. However, returning to the example above, it is intuitive to think that a truth about 
the number of grains in a bag of coffee does not carry the same epistemic value of, as 
Pritchard (2016, p. 139) exemplifies, a truth concerning fundamental physics. 
According to him, this calls for a reconsideration of the notion of epistemic value.  
Pritchard (ibid) points to a problem behind this notion of appraisal which is 
going to be important for the matters of reflective knowledge. Basically, from the fact 
that true belief is valued it doesn’t follow that all of them will be as well. Some true 
beliefs possess a distinctive content which allows them to manifest truth in a more 
encompassing way than others. To which Pritchard (2016, p. 140) adds that “aiming at 
the truth does not entail epistemically valuing all true beliefs equally”. More 
importantly, depending on the position of the subject, it is important that she ignores the 
trivial truths if she wants to be successful in achieving the most epistemically valued 
truth in her inquiring. As Pritchard (2016, p 137) demonstrates, this follows not only in 
the case of trivial truths, but also when facing counter-weighing reasons which 
misleadingly undermine one’s knowledge, i.e., misleading defeaters. Ignorance, in these 
cases, is epistemically valuable.  
Thus, returning to the case of reflective knowledge, it seems that the neglecting 
which does not render an epistemic agent blameful is not actually a case of negligence 
but, more specifically, one of epistemically valuable ignorance. And by ignorance I 
mean, at first, lack of true belief. This is considered the New View in the debate 
concerning ignorance, being the Standard View the one which endorses lack of 
knowledge. I mention ‘at first’ for I still think this is more of a tentative way of better 
understanding the Epistemology of the reflective, as Sosa (2015, p. 82) names it. I close 
with one example in order to illustrate the point. 
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So, imagine the case of an inquirer, I1, who is trying to discern what is the 
proper Situation for issuing the judgment that P, which is a hypotheses she is defending 
in her field. She took a long time developing the high level skills which allow her to 
perform this judgment now. However, this comes with a price. Other skills which could 
have given her a more encompassing perspective of P were not equally developed. This 
should not be deemed her fault, for she can’t develop many skills to a high level of 
performance. Now, picture another inquirer, I2. She has highly developed the skills I1 
lacks. I2’s view is that a few assumptions made by I1 in her judgement that P are 
problematic, for I1 seems to base her judgment on these assumptions without further 
reasons. I2 has very good points which are true and can count as undermining reasons 
against P. Given her limitations, the remarks raised by I2 are considered by I1, but she 
lacks the resources to better develop the skills I2 manifests. However, as she is highly 
confident in the judgment and understands that it would be probably true (or apt) if she 
had made it, she judges that P. It happens that, both, her apt judgment is aptly obtained 
and I2 remarks still hold. But the latter will take a longer time to be properly addressed, 
and they would not constitute a decisive hindrance for judgments like the one I1 made. 
I1’s judgment is made out of a choice to strategically ignore the points made by I2. 
My understanding is that I1’s reflective judgment benefited from a case where 
ignorance has epistemic value. Observe that she reflectively decides to take a direction 
in her judgment. It might be said that her success is explained by the competence she 
possess. My point is that it is partially explained. The way she strategically ignored the 
points made by I2 should not be taken as a denial of the remarks. Rather, it is simply an 
affirmation of the lack of resources to address them now. Besides, I1 can also advance 
her judgment as a contribution to partially reduce the problem of the need of more 
reasons for her assumptions. 
A few questions remain, though. For example, is the ignorance a case of lack of 
true belief or lack of knowledge? Is it best portrayed as a suspension of judgment 
regarding a few beliefs or as indifference? Is it factive or objectual ignorance?4 Thus, 
based on what I have argued until here, if ignorance can have this sort of epistemic 
 
4 Cf. Le Morvan and Peels (2016, p. 14). 
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value, the investigation of these points could be helpful for a better understanding of 
reflection’s epistemic value5.  
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